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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a claim for total and permanent disability benefits stemming from an 
industrial accident on October 4, 2008. The accident occurred when Trudy Deon's ("claimant") 
right hand became encircled and crushed in an electric auger while clearing a clogged drain in the 
kitchen of the Coeur d'Alene Inn & Conference Center ("employer"). Tr., p. 12. At all relevant 
times, the employer was insured by Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation ("surety") for 
industrial injuries. R. pp. 10-13. 
Following a formal hearing on October 16, 2012, the Industrial Commission 
("Commission") concluded on May 3, 2013 that the claimant was entitled to total and permanent 
disability benefits payable by the surety. R. p. 110. Simultaneously, the Commission also issued a 
notice of reconsideration sua sponte on May 3,2013, raising issue of an the affirmative defense of 
collateral estoppel on behalf of the employer/surety. R. pp. 112-114. 
On November 4, 2013, the Commission entered an order on reconsideration determining 
that the Claimant was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits payable by the surety 
and was instead entitled to an award of $38,612.64 (i.e. 23.92% PPD minus a $2,039.40 PPI 
payment). R. pp. 183-184. The Commission reached this result by relying on a settlement with the 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("IS IF") during the pendency of this case as a means to utilize 
the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel against the claimant. Id. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On October 4, 2008, the claimant suffered crush type injuries to her right hand in an 
industrial accident. R. p. 1. On January 18, 2011, the claimant filed a Complaint relating to the 
October 2008 accident alleging entitlement to additional medical/indemnity benefits. !d. On 
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January 28,2011, the employer/surety filed an Answer to the October 2008 accident stating that the 
claimant was not entitled to any additional medical/indemnity benefits. R. pp. 10-11. Shortly 
thereafter, the employer/surety alleged in discovery responses that claimant's impainnent and/or 
disability could relate to a prior industrial accident on February 9, 2007. R. p. 5. 
Claimant then filed a Complaint relating to the February 9, 2007, accident on March 29, 
2011. R. p. 5. The employer/surety filed an Answer on April 12,2011, claiming that the claimant 
was not entitled to any additional medicallindemnity benefits with respect to the February 9, 2007 
accident. R. pp. 12-13. 
On June 9, 2011, Claimant then filed a Complaint against the ISIF for total and permanent 
disability benefits. R. pp.l4-16. The ISIF filed an Answer on June 17, 2011, stating that the 
claimant was not entitled to any additional indemnity benefits from the ISIF as a result of the 
October 4,2008 accident. R. pp. 21-23. 
On July 1,2011, the Commission ordered all the matters referenced above consolidated into 
a single proceeding. R. pp. 24-25. On January 12,2012, the Commission set the case for hearing 
on October 16, 2012. R. p. 26. On October 2, 2012, the claimant filed her pre-hearing notice of 
witnesses, exhibits, and post-hearing depositions. R. pp. 29-31. On October 5, 2012, the 
employer/surety filed a joint supplemental notice of witnesses, exhibits, and post-hearing 
depositions. R. pp. 33-35. On October 9, 2012, the ISIF filed an exchange of exhibits and 
disclosure. R. pp. 36-38. 
On October 5, 2012, a joint mediation involving all of the parties was conducted 
telephonically by Commission mediator Dennis Burks. At the mediation, the ISIF successfully 
reached a settlement with the claimant but the employer/surety did not. The case then proceeded to 
hearing against the employer/surety with Commission Referee Alan Taylor on October 16, 2012. 
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R. p. 50. Post-hearing briefs were filed and the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Commission on December 24,2012. R. p. 50. 
Referee Taylor determined in a decision dated April 8, 2013, that the claimant's "right upper 
extremity alone renders her totally and permanently disabled." R. p. 77. The Referee relevantly 
concluded as a matter of law that the claimant had proven that she was totally and permanently 
disabled under the Lethrud test, that apportionment pursuant to I.C. §72-406 was moot, and 
apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 
54 (1984) was not appropriate. R. pp. 78-79. 
On May 3, 2013, the Commission declined to adopt Referee's Taylor recommendations in 
their entirety "due to the Referee's treatment of the vocational opinions offered by Nancy Collins, 
Mary Barros-Bailey and Dan Brownell." R. p. 112. However, the Commission agreed with 
Referee Taylor that the claimant had proven that she was totally and permanently disabled under the 
Lethrud test, apportionment pursuant to I.e. §72-406 was moot, and apportionment pursuant to 
Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) was not 
appropriate on May 3,2013. R. p. 110. 
Sua sponte, the Commission issued a notice of reconsideration of the May 3, 2013, 
conclusions of law, raising the affilmative defense of collateral estoppel on behalf of the 
employer/surety based on the settlement with the ISIF as fonnally approved by the Commission on 
November 8, 2012. R. pp. 112-126. The Commission ordered a revised simultaneous briefing on 
May 30, 2013, regarding the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel with opening briefs due on 
June 28, 2013, and reply briefs due on July 19,2013. On June 27, 2013, the employer/surety filed 
an opening brief regarding the impact ofthe ISIF settlement on the May 3, 2013 decision. Ex. Add. 
Doc. 4. On June 28, 2013, the claimant filed an opening brief. Ex. Add. Doc. 5. On July 18,2013, 
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the employer/surety filed a reply brief. Ex. Add. Doc. 6. On July 19, 2013, the claimant filed a 
reply brief. Ex. Add. Doc. 7. 
Before the Commission had ruled on the notice of reconsideration, the Claimant filed a 
motion for modification of the ISIF settlement agreement on July 26, 2013 to clarifY that the 
settlement agreement was not intended to have any collateral estoppel effect benefiting the 
employer/surety, together with a supporting affidavit. R. 127-141. The supporting affidavit 
contained an analysis by economist Dr. Torelli documenting the windfall of hundreds of thousands 
of dollars that the employer/surety would receive if the ISIF settlement agreement was used to bar 
payment ofthe claim for total and permanent disability benefits assessed against the surety. R. 136-
141. The employer/surety al1d ISIF filed responsive briefing opposing any attempt to modifY the 
settlement agreement on August 8, 2013, and August 9, 2013. R. 142-156. The claimant filed a 
reply brief on August 14,2013. R. 157-160. On September 27,2013, the Commission issued an 
order denying any modification to the ISIF settlement agreement based on its interpretation of I.C. 
§72-719(4). R. pp. 161-165. 
On November 4, 2013, the Commission entered an order on reconsideration applying the 
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel to reduce the award to the claimant from one of total and 
permanent disability payable by the surety to an award of $38,612.64 (i.e. 23.92% PPD minus a 
$2,039.40 PPI payment) payable by the surety. R. pp. 183-184. The Commission's order on 
reconsideration was based on its interpretation of Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). R. pp. 175-179. 
A notice of appeal was filed on November 14, 2013 and a first amended notice of appeal 
was filed on November 22,2013. R. pp. 186-198. 
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C. Concise Statement of Facts 
Trudy Deon was employed as a maintenance worker by the Coeur d'Alene Inn from June 
11, 2003, until November 15, 2009. Ex. 28, p. 14. Her duties were summarized in the job site 
evaluation ("JSE") performed by Beth Griggs of the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division 
("ICRD") as follows: 
Repairs and maintains rooms and facilities at motel and convention center. Uses hand and 
power tools to change lighting fixtures, unclog and repair plumbing, and repair damages 
to rooms. Changes HV AC filters and belts. Performs pool and spa maintenance. 
PerfOlms snow removal and outdoor landscaping. Ex. 1, p. 4; See also Ex. 28, pp. 22-29. 
On October 4, 2008, the claimant was in the kitchen of the employer working to unplug a drain that 
was clogged and flooding the kitchen area. Tr., p. 30, L. 21-23. In the process of cleaning out the 
drain, the claimant's right hand became entangled in an electric auger that encircled, twisted, and 
crushed her right hand. A co-worker eventually heard her cries for help and unplugged the device 
from the wall as a safety switch had been removed from the auger that would have allowed the 
claimant to shut off the device. Tr., p. 31, L. 1-14. Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") on 
November 3,2008 interpreted the injuries to the right hand as follows: 
Impression: 
1. Disruption of the A2 pulley system of the fourth digit with palmar bowing of the flexor 
tendon and edema surrounding the flexor tendon in this location compatible with focal 
tenosynovitis. 
2. Partial disruption or strain of the A2 pulley system of the fifth digit with palmar bowing of 
the flexor tendon and mild tenosynovitis. 
3. Nondisplaced fracture involving the distal aspect of the proximal phalanx of the fifth digit. 
Ex. 13, p. 148. 
The MRI report was amended on November 13,2008 to read as follows: 
Impression: 
1. Ligamentous tear and bowing of the flexor tendon in the fourth and fifth digits. This occurs 
just proximal to the interphalangeal joint. This is in the region of the proximal volar 
plate/check rain ligament and C2 Pulley. The fifth digit tear is partial. The fourth digit tear 
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is partial versus complete, with a partial tear favored as the tendon does not bowstring across 
the PIP joint. 
2. Increased signal adjacent to the radial and ulnar collateral ligaments of the fourth and fifth 
PIP joints. No gross disruption, probable sprain. 
3. Osseous contusion of the distal aspect of the fifth proximal phalanx. No definitive fracture, 
although a nondisplaced fracture cannot be excluded. Followup radiography may be 
helpful. 
4. Findings discussed with Dr. Mullen. Ex. 13, p. 151. 
The claimant consulted with a wide variety of specialists and underwent multiple physical 
therapy sessions with a wide variety of providers without substantial improvement over the next 
year before being discharged from physical therapy on October 28, 2009. Ex. 20, p. 260. In the 
interim, EMGINCV studies on the right upper extremity were interpreted as abnormal by Dr. 
Stevens, who concluded on August 19,2009 that: 
Her symptoms and examination do suggest an ulnar sensory nerve injury at the wrist 
involving both the deep and superficial branches causing hypesthesia within the classic ulnar 
pattern and also the dorsum of the hand within the dorsal ulnar cutaneous distribution. I 
strongly suspect that this is a compressive injury and likely a single event injury. It is 
unclear if there is actually any correctable lesion other than hoping that the sensation will 
gradually return with time. It would not be unreasonable to do an exploration but my 
suspicion is that there is no "correctable lesion" of the ulnar nerve. Ex. 14, p. 156. 
Dr. Stevens subsequently saw the claimant in the context of a medical examination at the request of 
the surety and assessed 2% upper extremity impairment. Ex. 14, p. 166. Dr. Stevens stated that 
while no restrictions were assessed based on objective matter, he would not be addressing the 
claimant subjective work tolerance and provided a full release on November 18, 2009. Ex. 14, p. 
167. The claimant was laid off by her supervisor, Jeff Mills, on behalf of the employer in 
November 2009. Mr. Mills testified at his deposition as follows: 
A: I believe I laid her off in about the 1 st of November 2009. 
Q: Okay. And why was that? 
A: She was not capable of performing her duties. Ex. 9, p. 98, L. 21-24. 
The claimant searched for work without success for approximately six months but was 
unsure of what work she would be able to perform as documented in the ICRD file. Ex. 1, pg. 
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23. On May 13, 2010, the Social Security Administration declared the claimant disabled and 
administrative judge Gene Duncan commented: 
The State agency medical consultants' physical assessments are given little weight because 
other medical opinions are more consistent with the record as a whole and evidence received 
at the hearing level shows that the claimant is more limited than determined by the State 
agency consultants. Greater weight has been given to the credible records of treating 
sources that have had an on-going relationship with the claimant. The undersigned finds the 
residual functional capacity (RFC) indicated above is supported by the totality of the 
objective medical findings and other evidence in the record. Ex. 4, p. 38. 
Judge Duncan concluded that: 
Even if the claimant had the residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work 
considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, a finding of "disabled" 
would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14. Ex. 4, p. 39. 
The claimant filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits against the 
employer/surety on January 18, 2011 and against the IS IF on June 9, 2011. R. p. 1 and 14. On 
September 16, 2011, the claimant was seen for a functional capacity evaluation ("FCE") at her own 
expense because the surety refused to pay for the evaluation despite recommendations from 
multiple treating physicians within the chain of referral for such a procedure. See Ex. 15, pp. 189-
190, Ex. 17, p. 207, R. 109. The FCE report concluded that the claimant would need to secure a 
job with "primarily left handed work with a weight load on the right of less than 5# lifting, up to 
20# with both hands, minimum repletion, and self paced" if she was to return to the labor force. Ex. 
12, p. 147. Vocational expert Dan Brownell concluded that with the claimant's learning disability, 
work history, and hand injury, she had incurred a loss of access to 90% of the labor market and 
would require a sympathetic employer to access the remaining positions. R. p. 99. 
On May 3, 2013, the Commission issued a decision determining that the claimant was an 
odd lot worker and totally and permanently disabled as a result of the last industrial accident under 
the Lethrud test, rendering apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road 
Department, 107 Idaho 109, 118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 (1984) inappropriate. R. p. 108. On May 3, 
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2013, the Commission raised the affinnative defense of collateral estoppel sua sponte on behalf of 
the employer/surety in a notice of reconsideration and subsequently issued an order on November 4, 
2013, detennining that claimant was not entitled to total and pennanent disability benefits. R. 183-
184. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Commission err in finding the elements of the collateral estoppel were met? 
2. Did the Commission en in raising the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel sua 
sponte on behalf of the employer/surety? 
3. Did the Commission violate the Claimant's right to due process? 
4. Did the Commission err in refusing to modify the ISIF settlement agreement pursuant to 
I.C. §72-719(3)? 
5. Is the ISIF settlement void as a matter oflaw? 
6. Should attorney fees be awarded on appeal? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014), this 
court reviewed the standard of review for an appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of 
Idaho and stated: 
When tlllS Court reviews a decision from tlie Industrial Commission, it exercises free review 
over questions of law but reviews questions of fact only to detennine whether substantial 
and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 
Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant 
evidence wruch a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic 
Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). The 
Commission's conclusions on the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed 
unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 
515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). 
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Whether collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation is a question 
of law upon which the court exercises free review. Rodriguez v. Dep 't of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 
92,29 P.3d, 401, 403 (2001). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
This appeal asks this court to assess whether the Commission should continue to use the 
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel to deny compensation to claimants instead of analyzing a 
claim on the merits. See Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, 
Idaho (2014). It is noteworthy from the commencement of this action until raised by the 
Commission, the employer/surety failed to raise the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. R. 
pp. 112-115. The employer/surety specifically waived the affirmative defense of collateral 
estoppel by failing to add it as an issue for hearing on October 16, 2012 as set forth in the 
hearing transcript below: 
REF. TAYLOR: 
MR.NEMEC: 
REF. TAYLOR: 
MR.NEMEC: 
MR. BROWN: 
Thank you, and welcome. The defendants, employer and surety, 
are represented by attorney Roger Brown. I note for the record 
that the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is not 
represented today. I understand, in communication received late 
last week, that the ISIF has settled with claimant prior to today, 
and I would just like Mr. Nemec to confirm that. 
That is correct. I have not received any of those documents, but 
we have reached a settlement on the issues. Tr. pp. 6-7. 
Okay, based on counsels' comments, it appears that we can delete 
issues one (b) and six, one (b) pertaining to TTDs and six 
pertaining to the liability of ISIF pursuant to 72-332. Anv further 
comments or issues, counsel? (emphasis added). 
I don't believe so. 
No, your Honor. 
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Tr. p. 10, L. 7-14. 
Whether the ISIF settlement agreement could have any collateral estoppel effect was ripe 
for adjudication on October 16, 2012. The employer/surety was aware of the settlement with 
ISIF prior to the hearing as noted in the hearing transcript above and the employer/surety was 
also present at the mediation of the matter on October 5, 2012. Perhaps more importantly, the 
employer/surety had approximately 1.5 months following the formal approval of the settlement 
to raise or argue this affirmative defense in their post-hearing brief and failed to do so. 
To argue that the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel was not npe for 
consideration as the Commission suggested in the Notice of Reconsideration is akin to arguing 
that apportionment defenses under I.C. §72-406 are not appropriate for review until the 
Commission has first held a primary hearing on the issue of PPI, and then a secondary hearing on 
apportionment as it relates to PPD. Were that the law, the policy of providing "sure and celiain" 
relief to injured workers would devolve into a Byzantine system of hearings that would further 
lengthen the time from injury to relief. 
While the Notice of Reconsideration states the employer/surety may not have had 
"independent knowledge of the tenns and conditions of Claimant's settlement with the ISIF," 
that statement should have had no bearing on the Commission's May 3, 2013 decision. See R. p. 
113. Specifically, the Claimant was under no duty to provide the ISIF settlement agreement to 
the employer/surety according to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure. More importantly, the employer/surety was aware of the ISIF settlement 
and a copy was available from from the Commission, Claimant, or the ISIF had they asked for 
one. 
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From a policy perspective, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has no place in the world of 
worker's compensation law because settlement agreements at the Commission are not examined 
on the merits, but rather a "best interests" standard. While the court may reverse the 
Commission's earlier decision determining that the claimant is not entitled to total and 
permanent disability benefits on a variety of grounds, it should be recognized that Tagg v. State 
of Idaho, ISIF, 123 Idaho 95,844 P.2d 1345 (1993) (which held that a third party beneficiary not 
named in a settlement agreement was not entitled to utilize the settlement agreement as res 
judicata) remains good law. 
The confusion sunounding collateral estoppel in industrial cases stems from the attempt 
to liken district courts out of which the doctrine arises with the Industrial Commission. By way 
of comparison, district courts typically never hear collateral estoppel arguments with respect to 
settlement agreements because the consent of the district court is not required for the parties to 
settle a case as it is with the Commission. If the cunent case was litigated in district court 
instead ofthe Commission, the employer/surety would be unable to obtain any offset for the ISIF 
settlement as a matter of law. See Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 141 P.3d 1099, 143 Idaho 230 
(2006). 
Finally even assuming that the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel could be used in 
an industrial case, celiain elements of the five elements test do not exist in the cunent case. In 
order to utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case, the Commission modified the test 
as they recently did in Vawter. Specifically, the Commission concluded that issues resolved via 
settlement satisfied the "actually decided in litigation" element of the test. The Commission also 
held and that a single case with multiple interlocutory orders actually contained multiple "final 
judgments on the merits" to satisfY the "final judgment on merits" element of the test. 
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In cobbling together a new collateral estoppel doctrine specific to industrial claims the 
Commission has created increased litigation, a chilling effect on settlement, protracted 
proceedings, strained judicial resources, and drastic and far reaching consequences for 
settlements that can reaching decades into the future for all parties. The result is directly 
contrary to the purpose of the act which is to provide for "sure and certain relief' to injured 
employees. I.C. §72-201. 
It is important to recall that utilization of collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense to 
avoid reaching a decision on the merits of a case appears to be a recent application of the 
doctrine to industrial claims following Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 
Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). If it chooses, this cOUli should clarify that Tagg remains good 
law and instmct the Commission to evaluate each claim on the merits, and to refrain from 
applying collateral estoppel as a bar to compensation to injured claimants. 
1. The Commission improperly found the elements of collateral estoppel were met. 
A. Liability of the Employer/Surety was not actually decided in the ISIF settlement. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously 
determined in a separate cause of action when: 
(l) the party against whom the earlier decision was asselied had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue 
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a 
final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the 
issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Stoddard v. 
Hagadone Corporation, 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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Thus the collateral estoppel doctrine prevents the relitigation of issues actually litigated 
and decided in a prior case. Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls 131 Idaho 99,102, 952 P.2d 914, 
917 (1998) citing Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183,731 P.2d 171, 178 (1986) 
(emphasis added). Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, 
albeit including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. See Sanije 
Berisha, Claimant, Ie 2002-003038, 2012 WL 2118142 (Idaho Ind. Com. May 30, 2012). 
Robertson suggests that the most critical clement of the five part test in collateral estoppel 
is that the issue must have actually been litigated and decided on the merits in the prior suit. See 
Id. at 103. 
There are many reasons why a party may choose not to raise an issue, or to contest an 
assertion in a patiicular action. The action may involve so small an amount that litigation 
of the issue may cost more than the value of the lawsuit. Or the form may be an 
inconvenient one in which to produce the necessary evidence or in which to litigate at all. 
The interests of conserving judicial resources, of maintaining consistency, and of 
avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party are less compelling when the 
issue on which preclusion is sought has not actually been litigated before. And if 
preclusive effect were given to issues not litigated, the result might be to discourage 
compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action would be 
narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation. Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments§ 27 comment e (1982). Id. (emphasis added). 
As further explained in Anderson v City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 182, 731 P.2d 171,177 
(1986): 
The theory of the use of judgments is not a matter to be lightly dogmatized about; yet it 
seems clear that the operation of recognizing it, when produced from another court, in 
support of a plaintiff or in defense of a defendant, is upon analysis not at all an 
employment of evidence. It is rather the lending of the court's executive aid, on certain 
terms, to a claimant or a defendant, without investigation of the merits of fact. 4 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1346 (Chadbourn rev.1972) (emphasis added); accord, Note, 
Judgments as Evidence, 46 Iowa L.Rev. 400 (1961); J. Weinstein and M. Berger, 4 
Weinstein's Evidence para. 803(22) [01] (1984). 
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In Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014), the 
Commission considered an interlocutory order regarding benefits owed to the claimant as 
synonymous with an "actual decision in prior litigation" under the third element of the collateral 
estoppel test. The Commission refused to award the claimant the full amount of medical benefits 
owed based on a prior interlocutory order which awarded the claimant a smaller amount. In 
reversing the Commission's decision, this court held collateral estoppel did not apply to cases 
involving multiple hearings with a single cause of action beause the "prior litigation" element of the 
collateral estoppel test was not met. Id. at 10. 
In Tagg v. State of Idaho, ISI}~ 123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (1993), the ISIF sought to 
use a settlement agreement between the claimant and employer/surety to preclude a subsequent 
claim against the ISIF. This court noted that Industrial Commission decisions are final and 
conclusive only at to the matters actually considered and adjudicated by the Commission. !d. at 
98. This court held that there was no compelling reason to depart from this principle. The court 
also held that the settlement agreement between claimant and employer/surety did not act to 
preclude a subsequent and previously unadjudicated claim against ISIF for compensation 
attributable to a pre-existing condition. Id. In issuing its decision in this case, the Commission 
failed to consider the Tagg holding and analysis. 
In Rajspic v Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665, 662 P.2d 534, 537 (1983), 
this court chose not to apply collateral estoppel to a stipulation from a prior case to a pending 
case because the Court was, "fHJesitant to hold in such circumstances that an issue resolved by 
stipulation has been litigated or determined for purposes of collateral estoppel." The 
Commission failed to recognize this directive in applying collateral estoppel in this case. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States commented on whether collateral estoppel 
should apply to stipulated or consent judgments in Arizona v California, 530 U.S. 392,414, 120 
S.Ct. 2304, 2319 (2000) as follows: 
But settlements ordinarily occasion no issue preclusion, (sometimes called collateral 
estoppel), unless it is clear, as it is not here, that the parties intend their agreement to have 
such an effect. "In most circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements 
ordinarily are intended to preclude fmiher litigation on the claim presented but are not 
intended to preclude further litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus consent 
judgments ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion." 18 Charles 
Alan Wright, Arther R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§4443, pp. 384-385 (1981). This differentiation is grounded in basic res judicata 
doctrine. It is the general rule that issue preclusion attaches only "[ w]hen an issue of fact 
or law is actually litigated and detelmined by a valid and final judgment, and the 
determination is essential to the judgment." Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27, p. 
250 (1982). "In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, 
none of the issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section [describing 
issue preclusion's domain] does not apply to any issue in a subsequent action." Id., 
comment eat 257 (emphasis added). 
Thus, to be given preclusive effect, the issue must have been "actually litigated, squarely 
addressed and specifically decided." Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v. Anna Marie 
Bowling Irrevocable Trust, 410 F.3d 304,312 (2005). "An issue is not actually litigated if, for 
example, there has been a default, a confession of liability, a failure to place a matter in issue by 
proper pleading or even because of a stipulation (Restatement [Second] of Judgments §27 
comments d, e, at 255-257 (emphasis added); see also, Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285,441 
N.Y.S.2d 49,423 N.E.2d 807, supra). Katifman v. Eli Lilly and Company, 65 N.Y.2d 449,482 
N.E.2d 63, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, (1985). Where an issue is uncontested, such as an ooderlying 
point in a settlement agreement, the issue was not actually litigated in the prior proceeding and 
therefore is not precluded from a subsequent one. Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v. 
Anna Marie Bowling Irrevocable Trust, 410 F.3d 304, 312 (2005). 
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Applying these principles to a worker's compensation claim in which the claimant sought 
to challenge the Board's failure to give preclusive effect to an earlier lump sum settlement, a 
New Hampshire court noted, "[ c Jollateral estoppel may be invoked to preclude reconsideration 
of an issue only when the issue has been actually litigated. Where ... the final judgment ... was 
based on a stipulation of settlement, the issue asserted for preclusion was not actually litigated." 
MA. Crowley Trucking v. Moyers, 140 N.H. 190, 195, 665 A.2d 1077, 1080 (1995) (citations 
omitted). Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply to any issues conceded in the lump sum 
settlement. Appeal of Hooker, 142 N.H. 40,46, 694 A.2d 984,988 (1997) (emphasis added). 
In the pending appeal as in the recent Vawter decision, it was improper for the 
Commission to apply collateral estoppel where was a single cause of action and all of the 
settlements/orders were part of the same case. See Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d-
---,2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014). Even if there were multiple cases, this court should clarify 
that a settlement in an industrial case is not synonymous with deciding a case on the merits. In 
this case, the claimant never actually litigated the ultimate issue of employer/surety liability and 
ISIF liability until it was detennined on May 3, 2013, that the employer/surety was 100% liable. 
The fact that the Commission found the employer/surety 100% liable in this case is ipso facto 
proof that the Commission did not previously litigate/decide this issue in the ISIF settlement. 
ISIF liability was arrived at through stipulation in the settlement agreement in between the 
claimant and ISIF. Thus just as the comi did in Rajspic, this court should decline to hold that an 
issue resolved by stipulation has been litigated or detennined for purposes of collateral estoppel. 
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B.} The ISIF settlement is not afinaljudgment on the merits 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously 
detelTIlined in a separate cause of action when: 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue 
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final 
judgment on the merits the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue 
is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Stoddard v. Hagadone 
Corporation, 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009). 
This five-part test originated in district court cases and is believed to have been successfully 
applied to a worker's compensation case post-Tagg in Jackman v. State of Idaho, Irzdustrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689,951 P.2d 1207 (1997). In Jackman, the court held that a 
settlement with the employer/surety precluded a claim brought against the ISIF on the basis of 
collateral estoppel. Prior to Jackman, it is not believed that a settlement with the 
employer/surety had been used to preclude a claim against the ISIF using the affilTIlative defense 
of collateral estoppeL See, Tagg v State of Idaho, ISIF, 123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (1993). 
The application of collateral estoppel in an industrial case is troubling as Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(a) defines a final judgment as one which has been entered on all claims of 
relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. This court has 
previously held that Commission decisions which reserve jurisdiction for any reason, such as the 
determination of additional damages, are not final decisions/judgments of the Commission for 
purposes of appeal. See Jensen v. The Pillsbury Company, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). 
Thus, there is a clear distinction between an interlocutory decision and a final judgment on the 
merits in a Commission case. 
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In Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014), the 
Commission attempted to equate an interlocutory order awarding medical benefits with a final 
judgment on the merits despite the fact that additional hearings were being held and no final, 
appealable order had been entered. In reversing the Commission's legal conclusion that collateral 
estoppel could apply, this court held: 
The Commission's 2010 order awarding medical benefits was not a final order, but rather, 
an interlocutory order that was subject to modification until such time as a final appealable 
order was entered. Thus, the Commission's decision to apply collateral estoppel was in 
error. For that reason, Vawter is entitled to recover all of his medical expenses, as initially 
provided by the Commission in its 12-5-12 Order. Id. at 10. 
Another clear illustration of the failure to obtain a final judgment with respect to 
collateral estoppel is seen in Richardson v. Navistar int '[ Transp. Corp., 170 F.3d 1264, (10th 
Cir. 1999). In that case, the plaintiffs settled with the original defendants in an action following 
trial where a jury verdict allocated 100% of the fault between the original defendants and the 
plaintiff, but before entry of a final judgment. The plaintiffs then filed a second lawsuit against a 
different group of defendants not named in the first suit who raised the affirmative defense of 
collateral estoppel. The Utah Supreme Court held that even though liability had previously been 
determined in the prior case, because a final judgment had never been entered, the jury verdict 
did not bind any party or the court. 
With respect to the approval of a settlement agreement, it is apparent that the decision to 
approve or disapprove of the compensation is the final "decision" or interlocutory award of the 
Commission and it is not a decision on the merits. See Davidson v. HH Kiem Company, 110 
Idaho 758, 760, 778 P.2d 1196, 1198 (1986). In a typical case, the procedure for approval of a 
lump sum settlement agreement (LSSA) is as follows: 
When an LSSA is presented to the Commission, it may approve or deny the settlement 
based on the "best interests of all parties." I.C. §72-404; l.R.P. XVIII(B). The 
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Commission's Rule XVIII(C) gives a short list of all the documentation an LSSA 
submission is expected to contain. If the LSSA is approved, that ends the matter. If it is 
denied, the Commission may request additional information, or the Commission or either 
party may "schedule a hearing limited to the issue of whether the lump sum settlement ... 
is for the best interests of all parties." l.R.P. XVIII(D). The Commission's intemal rules 
state that "[t]here is no appeal from the Commission's decision" regarding approval or 
denial of an LSSA. Id. If the Commission denies the settlement agreement at the 
hearing, a claimant may leave the LSSA behind and request a final hearing on the 
merits. (emphasis added). ())1Jsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 
P.3d 455 (2005). 
Applying the rationale from Jackman to the current industrial case as the Commission did 
is flawed as the settlement agreement with the ISIF did not end the litigation in this case as it did 
in Jackman and was thus not a final judgment on the merits. In Jackman, the Claimant had 
settled with the employer/surety four years before he ever brought his claim against the ISIF in a 
separate case-a different set of facts from those currently before the court where the settlement 
with the ISIF was merely an interlocutory order prior to the final judgment on the merits on May 
3, 2013. Vawter's holding has clarified that interlocutory orders cannot be used for purposes of 
collateral estoppel. To the extent that Jackman is now in conflict with Vawter and Tagg, it 
should be overruled. 
2. The Commission erred in raising the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel 
sua sponte on behalf of the employer/surety. 
This court has held on numerous occasions that affirmative defenses such as collateral 
estoppel must be plead prior to the trial of a matter or they are waived. Patterson v. State, Dept. 
of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 256 P.3d 718 (2011); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103, Idaho 
453, 456, 649 P.2d 1209,1212 (1982); See also LR.C.P. 8(c). Failure to raise an affirmative 
defense ordinarily results in a waiver of the defense. Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 
686 P.2d 79 (Ct. App.l984). In the industrial case Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc, 103 Idaho 458,649 
P.2d 1214 (1982), this court held the burden to raise the issue of apportionment with respect to 
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disability benefits rested with the defense and the failure to raise apportionment at hearing 
rendered any review by the Supreme COUli inappropriate. In the industrial case Paull v. Preston 
Theatres Corporation, 63 Idaho 594, 124 P.2d 562, (1942), the defendants attempted to raise an 
affirmative defense after a hearing on the merits. In refusing such relief this court cited with 
approval Utah Delaware Mining Co. v Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930), 
which commented on the duty to raise affirmative defenses with greater clarity, holding: 
The general rule is that a party can rely on the statute of limitations only where he pleads 
it and ordinarily is required to interpose the plea at his first opportunity. Generally, new 
trials or rehearings are to give a defeated party an opportunity to interpose 
the statute of limitations where he theretofore and before an adjudication on merits had 
full opportunity to interpose it. Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
Recently, the Commission stated that, "It is the obligation of the parties to indicate what the 
disputed issues are for hearing. See Phinney v. Shoshone Medical Center, 131 Idaho 529, 532, 
960 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1998). The Commission cannot decide issues that are not before it." 
Sherri Troutwine, Claimant, IC 2006,012796, 2009 WL 5850565 (Idaho Ind. Com. November 
27,2009). 
In this case, the Answer filed by the employer/surety on January 28, 2011 failed to list 
collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense. R. pp. 10-11. Despite having knowledge that the 
claimant had settled with the ISIF at mediation and had invoked ISIF liability in a total and 
pennanent disability claim, the employer/surety failed to raise this defense at the hearing of this 
matter or at anytime thereafter. Indeed, the employer/surety has yet to properly amend their 
Answer in this matter. The employer/surety failed to raise collateral estoppel in post-hearing 
briefing. As the employer/surety's post-hearing brief was not due until December 17, 2012, 
employer/surety clearly had ample opportunity to argue whether the ISIF settlement could have 
had collateral estoppel effect. Because the Claimant consistently argued for total and permanent 
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disability and invoked ISIF liability long before defendant's brief was due, a definitive issue 
involving concrete facts with respect to an apportionment defense could have easily been 
adjudicated by Referee Taylor who took this claim under advisement on December 24, 2012, 
prior to the formal adjudication on the merits on May 3,2013. 
\Vhen the defendants failed to raise the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel or even 
address the Carey formula issue in their briefing, just as in Baldner and Paull, the claimant in 
this case was entitled to rely upon the finality of the adjudication on May 3, 2013. Given that the 
employer/surety viewed this claim as one involving less than total disability according to their 
arguments and briefing throughout this litigation, it appears that the employer/surety made a 
tactical decision to avoid raising the collateral estoppel defense. Raising such a defense would 
have suggested that the employer/surety contemplated liability for a total and permanent 
disability claim, a proposition that defendants chose to vigorously contest over several years of 
litigation. To raise collateral estoppel as a defense would have placed the employer/surety at a 
heightened risk for an award of the claimant's attorney fees for the failure to pay any disability 
benefits following the payment of the PPI award in 2009 to present day. 
Finally, it is not the Commission's function to serve as trial strategist for any litigant. In 
this case, the Commission acted in direct contravention of Trounvine in which the Commission 
concluded it "cannot decide issues that are not before it." Sherri Troutwine, Claimant, IC 
2006,012796, 2009 WL 5850565 (Idaho Ind. Com. November 27, 2009). In raising the 
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel that the employer/surety waived at hearing after 
approving the ISIF settlement, the Commission created the perfect procedural booby trap. See 
Tr. p. 10 L. 7-14. The Commission's advocacy for the employer/surety has essentially changed 
an award of lifetime disability benefits into a claim worth exactly $108,612.64. R. pp. 183-184. 
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3. The Commission violated the Claimant's right to due process. 
This Court has held that administrative tribunals are unable to raise issues without first 
serving an affected party with "fair notice" and a "full opportunity" to meet such issues. Gomez 
v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 272 P.3d 569, 573 (2012). Pursuant to the codification 
of that rule in I.C.§72-713, the Commission is required to give the parties at least ten (10) days 
notice of the issues to be decided at hearing unless the parties stipulate otherwise1• This 
procedure allows the parties' to easily modify the issues to provide a meaningful hearing of the 
relevant issues on the merits. 
In this patiicular case, employer/surety did not request that the affirmative defense of 
collateral estoppel be included in the notice of hearing, at the hearing, or anytime after the 
hearing until prompted to do so at the urging of the Commission following the entry of a 
favorable decision for the claimant. As such, the claimant was prejudiced by this late notice. 
Had proper notice been provided, the claimant would have conducted the prosecution of this 
claim in a different manner. If the employer/surety had stated at hearing that collateral estoppel 
would be argued based on the settlement with the ISIF, the claimant could have simply refused 
to endorse the settlement and avoided this procedural morass. By interjecting the affirmative 
defense into these proceedings following an adjudication by the Commission, the Conmlission 
has prejudiced the claimant's rights. 
4. The Commission erred in refusing to modify the ISIF settlement agreement. 
Idaho Code provides for the modification of a settlement agreement approved by the 
Industrial Commission by means ofI.C. §72-719(3). See Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho, 9,12,644 
P. 2d 331,334 (1982). Specifically, I.C. §72-719(3) states as follows: 
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date of 
1 A stipulation or mutual agreement to modifY the issues on the day of hearing is common at the Commission 
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accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, may 
review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice. Id. 
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or recognized at once 
by the mind; not obscure; obvious. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. Sines v. 
Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 13, 644 P. 2d 331, 335 (1982). "Injustice" has been defined to mean: 
absence of justice, violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust act 
or deed; wrong. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. Id. 
In the context of workers' compensation, an example of a manifestly unjust decision 
would be one that deprives a claimant of benefits that she is obviously entitled to receive. The 
court has held that the Commission may review any order to correct a manifest injustice, even 
when a purported manifest injustice is brought to the Commission's attention by either party or a 
third party. Page v. NleCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). Specifically, the 
court has previously held that settlement agreements may be modified to correct a manifest 
injustice in Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008); Sund v. Gambrel, 
127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995); Matthews v. Department o/Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 827 
P.2d 693, (1992); Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 644 P. 2d 331 (1982); and Banzha/ v. Carnation 
Co. 104 Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983). 
In this case, the employer/surety will owe the Claimant approximately $77,629.28 in total 
permanent disability benefits [or the period of time from November 18, 2009 thru January 1, 
20152. R. 138-141. If the court determines that the Commission was correct in detennining that 
the ISIF settlement agreement had a collateral estoppel impact limiting the amount that the 
employer/surety owes, the end result will be a windfall profit of over $500,000.00 to the 
employer/surety on a claim where the Commission initially found the employer/surety liable for 
2 It is estimated that the court may issue a decision in early 2015 
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lifetime disability benefits. R. 138-141. 
The employer/surety has not provided any consideration to the claimant for the windfall 
they seek to obtain and the claimant never intended to provide the surety with a release of 
liability when she signed the ISIF settlement agreement. Should the court accept the untimely 
affirmative defense raised by the employer/surety following an adjudication on the merits on 
May 3,2013, the claimant will be left to spend the rest of her life subsisting on a net income of 
$820.40/month in Social Security benefits. Ex. 2, p. 26. This is precisely the type of situation 
I.e. §72-719(3) was created to remedy. As such, it is respectfully requested that the court direct 
the Commission to add language to the ISIF settlement agreement clarifying that the settlement 
agreement was not intended to have a collateral estoppel effect benefitting the employer/surety if 
collateral estoppel is even deemed to be an applicable defense. 
5. The ISIF settlement is void as a matter of law. 
I.e. §72-318(2) states that, "No agreement by an employee to Waive his rights to 
compensation under this act shall be valid." I.C. §72-318(2) must be interpreted to prohibit all 
agreements that waive an employee's rights to compensation under the Act. Wernecke v. St. Maries 
Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 283, 207 P.3d 1008, 1014 (2009). In this case, the 
Commission's order on reconsideration has construed the ISIF settlement agreement as a waiver of 
her right to total and pennanent disability benefits paid by the employer/surety as determined in the 
May 3, 2013 order. R. p. 110. Additionally, the May 3, 2013, order determined that the ISIF had 
no liability in the current matter when the claim was examined on the merits. R. p. 110. As was 
stated in Wernecke, if the ISIF settlement agreement is void, there can be no basis for imposing' 
collateral estoppel because there is no valid fmaljudgment. Id. at 289. 
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6. Attorney fees should be awarded on appeal 
Attorney fees are awarded on appeal in an industrial case if the court determines that the 
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee without 
reasonable grounds pursuant to I.C. §72-804. In this particular case, the employer/surety has raised 
the same tired arguments regarding collateral estoppel as a means to avoid compensating the 
claimant as this court recently found wanting in Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 
2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014). In reviewing Vawter, the undersigned is unable to appreciate any 
discernible difference in the arguments put forward by the employer/surety in that case and the 
arguments put forward by the employer/surety in this case. As such, the arguments now being 
advanced by the surety have previously been determined to be without merit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is the policy of worker's compensation statutes to encourage "sure and certain relief for 
injured workers." I.e. §72-201. It should not be the policy of the Industrial Commission to use 
settlement agreements to avoid deciding a claim on its merits. To the extent that Jackman 
conflicts with this policy, Jackman should be ovelTuled as it conflicts with the courts well 
reasoned holdings in Tagg and Vawter. 
Based on the argument presented herein, the Commission's prior detelmination that 
collateral estoppel is applicable should be reversed and the case remanded back to the 
Commission so that the May 3, 2013 order assessing total and permanent disability benefits 
against the surety is reinstated. 
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